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Abstract
This thesis presents an out-of-order processor core design that accelerates the reliable
computation application focused URISC-MIPS core. The URISC-MIPS core provides a
hardened Ultra Reduced Instruction Set Core (URISC) along side a simple MIPS core.
The URSIC instructions are used to check for faulty MIPS instructions/execution units
and retain functionality by replacing faulted MIPS instructions with equivalent URISC
instructions. Previous work presents a URISC-MIPS core limited to executing a single
URISC or MIPS instruction per cycle. This thesis analyses the causes for this limitation
and proposes a core design that accelerates computation by overcoming this limitation. A
compiler interleave step is additionally introduced to better utilize execution units. The
resulting core better utilizes the hardware and unlocks parallelism by executing URISC
and MIPS instructions in parallel. Multiple benchmarks utilizing URISC instructions are
executed to compare the performance of the new core relative to the original URISC-MIPS
core. The results show speedups between 1.16 and 4.22 (geometric average 1.90 times
speedup) with the new design.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern safety critical systems require the ability to detect and handle situations where
an error has occurred. Common applications needing this capability include health care,
transportation (space applications, aviation, vehicles, etc), and automated machinery (in-
dustrial control, robotics, nuclear power stations, etc.). Essentially anywhere where a
failure of the computer system could cause bodily harm or loss of life needs the computer
system to be able to recognize when things go wrong and recover. Depending on the sever-
ity of the error, the solution may be to simply retry the transmission or computation or to
admit that things have gotten out of hand and automatically shut down the nuclear power
plant or disengage the autopilot and turn over control to the operator.
Modern computer and communication systems employ multiple error detection and
correction features to protect the communication, storage and computation system com-
ponents from errors.
External communication links are generally protected by channel coding to detect and
correct errors.
Storage elements such as hard drives, external disks, and flash storage employ tech-
niques such as RAID, parity checks, and/or error correcting code (ECC) while storing and
retrieving data. On chip memory (including caches) may employ parity checks and ECC.
On chip buses can extend the error detection across the bus by carrying parity bits to
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protect the control and data lines.
Computation units, such as computer cores, may have a variety of features for fault
detection and correction implemented as well. Solutions range from modular redundancy
(usually Triple Modular Redundancy where three cores independently compute the result),
to fine grained detection and protection on different core control and computation units or
structures.
This thesis will focus on one approach to perform fine grained protection of compu-
tational core units. The approach in question is to extend a core with a hardened Ul-
tra Reduced Instruction Set [1] (URISC) co-processor, forming a core called TigerMIPS-
URSIC [2].
The TigerMIPS-URISC core can protect against both permanent and transient faults
effectively. It is designed to be operated in conjunction with a customized compiler and as-
sembler that selectively adds instructions to check or replace MIPS instructions. However,
previous designs add significant performance overheads when using URISC instructions to
check for or replace defective MIPS instructions.
1.1 Contribution
This thesis analyses the overhead introduced in the TigerMIPS-URISC core design to
identify opportunities to accelerate the computation. Based on the analysis we determine
that an out-of-order core design would accelerate fault tolerant MIPS and Ultra Reduced
Instruction Set Coprocessor (URISC) programs.
We design and build an out of order core supporting both MIPS and URISC instruc-
tions. This new core effectively exploits the parallelism available in MIPS-URISC programs
and significantly reduces the overhead introduced when checking or substituting URISC
instructions for faulted MIPS instructions.
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1.2 Thesis Structure
The following chapters of this thesis are structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides back-
ground on the causes of permanent and transient errors in chips. It also provides an
overview of the approaches examined in literature to address these errors in processor
cores. Chapter 3 provides an in depth review of the URISC SUBLEQ instruction and the
TigerMIPS-URISC core.
Chapter 4 analyses the TigerMIPS-USRIC implementation described in [2] and out-
lines opportunities for running instructions in parallel. The challenges of running these
instructions in parallel along with solutions are considered to accelerate the core.
Chapter 5 describes the proposed solution core design to accelerate the TigerMIPS-
USRIC core. Chapter 6 describes compiler modifications to fully exploit the changes in
the new core.
Simulation results comparing our core to the previous implementation are presented in
Chapter 7 to demonstrate the speedup of the new core. We conclude in Chapter 8 and
provide areas for future research.
3
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
Today’s digital designs are steadily increasing in complexity and gate count. To keep up
with this increasing gate count, CMOS process technology is aggressively scaling down
transistor feature sizes. As transistors get smaller they become more susceptible to faults
for the reasons described later in this chapter. To produce operational large designs each
and every component of a chip needs to operate correctly or be resilient to faults. With
more transistors on a chip, the probability that all transistors in a large design are fault
free decreases. Without techniques to handle faults, the faults will impact chip yield
(permanent faults) and chip reliability (transient faults).
This chapter provides background on fault sources and techniques to detect and recover
from faults in the major components in a digital system: communication links, storage,
and computation. Some circuit level hardening techniques are described enabling certain
circuits to be made more robust and an out of order design technique is outlined that
makes better use of core execution units. Using these techniques an operational system
can be retained even in the presence of various faults.
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2.1 Faults
Faults can be categorized as:
• Permanent Faults - where a wire or register is permanently stuck either high or
low.
• Transient Faults - where a wire or register is sometimes at the wrong value.
2.1.1 Permanent Faults
Permanent faults are primarily caused by design errors or manufacturing/silicon defects.
Design errors are cases where the value of a wire or register is not at the desired value.
This may be because of a mistaken specification, incorrect implementation, synthesis, or
verification escape. Also included here are data dependent worst case timing paths where
the timing is not met under some conditions (although this may present itself as a transient
fault, the path should fail every time given the same inputs - this is still a permanent fault).
Manufacturing or silicon defects are another cause of permanent faults. These are
localized defects in the silicon substrate (impurities or silicon structure irregularities) or
irregularities in a layer’s deposition or etching steps. Silicon substrate defects are typically
not a function of the transistor size of the process in use. When working with large feature
sizes, a given defect may not be large enough to affect the transistor, but as the transistor
size shrinks, the same defect will be large enough to cause an fault in the transistor. As
the transistor sizes shrink and density increases, the same defect may even be large enough
to affect multiple adjacent transistors at once.
Most permanent faults can be detected shortly after fabrication during testing. Those
chips with faults that can’t be compensated for will decrease the yield.
2.1.2 Transient Faults
Transient faults can be caused by both external and internal interference or ageing effects.
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Magnetic fields or an energetic particles can cause transient faults. A strong enough
external magnetic field can introduce a momentary incorrect value on a trace. A stray
highly charged particle that impacts a transistor can deposit charge where it should not
be and cause a momentarily incorrect value. If this impacts the transistor in a flip flop,
the stored value could be altered. These external effects are typically a rare occurrence
in most environments, however some harsh environments (space, nuclear) will see a higher
rate of these faults.
Internal transient faults are caused by either crosstalk or timing performance degrada-
tion. Crosstalk between adjacent wires could introduce a transient error in the wire value
and potentially the flip flop capturing the value. Timing performance problems such as
Electromigration and Bias Temperature Instability (BTI) are caused by use and age. Elec-
tromigration is the gradual movement of metal ions in traces due to current flows, gradually
thinning portions of the conductors. This first leads to higher resistance resulting in slower
voltage changes, and eventually an open circuit or short if enough metal migrates. Bias
Temperature Instability changes the threshold voltages of transistors over time causing
small shifts in timing. Both these affects can be exacerbated due to manufacturing defects
that can leave transistors in a marginal state - sometimes causing an error and sometimes
operating correctly. As the transistor continues to age, the degradation may become severe
enough to become a permanent fault.
Environmental conditions, such as temperature and voltage changes can exacerbate the
problems described in the previous paragraphs. While the area affected by sources such
as highly charged particles and silicon defects remains the same, the number of transistors
in that same area are increasing, leading to more transistors subject to fault in equal area
designs.
2.2 Fault Protection in Communication Links
Communication links in digital systems range from internal chip buses (custom serial,
AHB, APB, AXI, ...), chip to chip buses (serial, PCI, SCSI, I2C, SPI, DDR, GDDR, ...)
all the way to noisy radio links. Faults on these links are primarily transient faults due to
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external interference.
On internal chip buses and chip to chip buses the error rate is generally small and
parity bits, CRC checksums, or ECC (typically Hamming code) are sufficient to detect
them. Recovery is accomplished by applying the ECC or by repeating the transaction.
On noisy radio or other external links with high error rates more powerful error cor-
recting code is applied to both increase reliability and better utilize the channel capacity.
Techniques such as convolutional coding, Viterbi, turbo codes, and Low Density Parity
Check (LDPC) coding allow communication channels to approach the channel capacity
limit for various error rates. As with low error rate channels, retransmissions are employed
if the error correction code is unable to recover the data given a particular set of errors.
2.3 Fault Protection in Storage Components
Storage components range from removable disks (optical or magnetic), magnetic hard
drives, flash (SSD) drives, RAM (either on or off chip), and caches.
In these components we are concerned with both permanent faults rendering a portion
of the memory unusable and ageing of the storage media or interference changing the state
of stored information.
Large storage volumes can use parity check approaches such as RAID (1-6) to protect
against loss due to errors. RAID either duplicates and distributes the data or stores enough
parity bits on different disks to recover the data from a lost disk. Although historically
applied to multiple separate disks, the same techniques can be applied to the multiple chips
in flash SSDs. Individual words (or blocks of words) stored on disk are often stored with
some form of small ECC to protect against single (or a few) bit flips in the underlying
storage media. With rapid advance of flash storage and use of denser and more error prone
multi-level cells for storage, ECC (often BCH code) has become a necessity.
On chip memories (RAM and caches) store smaller pieces of information for shorter
periods of time. Protection is applied in smaller groups of bytes, typically in the form of
parity bits or small ECC (such as Hamming code) such as that used in ECC RAM.
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All of the above storage components can also have a way to mark sections of the storage
media as faulted so the affected addresses can either be avoided or remapped to another
backup block of memory.
As the amount of storage in today’s systems continues to grow (increasing the area of
the chip dedicated to memory), the error detection and correction techniques mentioned
above become a necessity to achieve acceptable yields.
2.4 Fault Protection in Computation Components
With error protection available for the communication links (subsection 2.2) and storage
(subsection 2.3), the majority of remaining unprotected digital area on the chip is in the
computation components - processor cores and accelerators. In most cases a faulted special
purpose accelerator’s function can be taken over by another accelerator or the more general
purpose processor core. However, the processor core’s function usually can’t be taken over
by the special purpose accelerator. Since a fault in an unprotected processor core can not
be compensated for with any other component on the chip, we’ll focus on fault protection
techniques for processor cores.
The techniques detailed in this section range from techniques designed purely to de-
tect errors to those that both detect and correct errors and to those that seek to increase
throughput in the fault free case while gracefully degrading their performance while re-
maining operational in the presence of faults.
2.4.1 Dual and Triple Modular Redundancy
One of the oldest approaches to fault detection is to create multiple copies of the core.
Each core is asked to do the same computation and the results are compared. If the
results differ, an error has been detected and some error handling process begins. With
Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) there are two copies of the core that can detect errors.
Adding a third core produces Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) and allows voting on
the results to judge one of the three results in error.
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The NASA Space Shuttle uses a triple redundant system for flight control with the
flight control actuators using the three results from the three systems to vote on the action
taken. The system that returns a different answer is out voted and an error is indicated
to the crew so they can power down or reset the faulty system. This approach protects
against both permanent faults and transient faults.
The biggest disadvantage of DMR or TMR is the the amount of overhead involved -
area and power are both doubled or tripled. The applications where this increase in area
and power are accepted has historically been limited to risk averse applications such as
flight control, nuclear power plants, or machine control where a failure would cause risk
injury or death.
2.4.2 Razor
The Razor framework[3][4] proposes increased performance by adding special detection
circuits to the longest timing paths to detect when timing is violated. The clock rate is
dynamically increased until timing errors are observed then reduced to keep the system
just barely meeting timing. When a timing error is detected, recovery happens by slowing
the clock rate and repeating the calculation.
When chips are designed they are typically designed to their worst case tempera-
ture/voltage delay corner and some margin is added for timing uncertainty of the process.
The Razor approach is able to extract additional performance out of a chip by operating the
chip at the maximum clock rate for the actual operating temperature/voltage conditions
and adapting when they change.
Additional overhead is modest, as circuitry is only added to the longest timing paths.
This approach is able to detect transient faults due to timing, but is unable to detect or
correct permanent faults or faults due to interference.
2.4.3 Detouring and Salvaging
The Detouring and Salvaging approaches are methods to retain functionality in the pres-
ence of permanent faults. They rely on a built in self test (BIST) component or a test
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program and a set of pre-defined test vectors to identify which parts of the core are in
broken. Once a hard fault has been detected, yield can be increased by working around
the defective component. These approaches are targeted at smaller cores.
The Detouring [5] approach chooses to recompile a program to avoid broken instructions
and therefore can continue to run on a core with defective instructions. While many
instructions are replaceable by other instructions in the instruction set, it is limited by the
fact that not all instructions have substitute instructions in the instruction set.
The Salvaging [6] approach is applicable to a multi-core system. It requires an OS
aware of the faulted instructions for each core and which instructions are needed by which
portions of a program or thread. When a program (or thread) needs to execute instructions
that are broken in the current core, the OS swaps the thread to a different core where those
instructions are not broken.
The Necromancer [7] approach uses a broken complex core and a known good simple
core to try to predict when the broken core gets off track. The simple core trails the
complex core’s execution utilizing the complex core’s execution path to avoid stalls around
branch prediction and memory access. If an incorrect path is detected a recovery is then
started.
2.4.4 Microarchitectural Redundancy and Structural Duplica-
tion
With super-scalar processors many components of the core are already duplicated for per-
formance reasons (such as execution units, cache blocks, etc). If a unit in the core is found
to be defective, it is simply disabled, and other identical units are scheduled to perform
the same operation [8]. This approach allows a core to operate at full capacity when no
faults are present but to decay gracefully when certain faults occur. It is limited by the
number of duplicated components in a core. Further work [9] proposes cores designs that
intentionally ensure each component is fully duplicated for better fault tolerance.
The Bulletproof[10] approach for super-scalar processors introduces a checkpointing
approach with built in self tests being run on execution units during idle cycles. The
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purpose is to detect hard faults developing in a core with minimal impact to the running
programs. Once a full self test has completed successfully, a new checkpoint is created and
processing continues from the new checkpoint. If the self test fails, the failing execution
unit is marked as failed preventing instructions from being issued to it, the saved checkpoint
is restored and the computation is restarted from that point.
2.4.5 DIVA
The DIVA concept[11] proposes adding a small in-order checker core to a superscalar out-
of-order core that checks each instruction in the ROB as it retires, preventing an instruction
from retiring if it isn’t correct.
The DIVA concept was further extended to perform online checks of a core and disable
faulty components[12].
2.4.6 Argus
The Argus [13] approach looks at small simple cores and adds small hardware checkers to
check hardware invariants. It only detects a percentage of faults and can not correct them.
2.4.7 URISC
The DIVA approach works well for large cores as the addition of one very small in-order
core adds little overhead. When DIVA is applied to a simple core the overhead of the DIVA
core becomes similar to that of the simple core.
An approach that reduces the overhead suitably is to use a very small core, such as an
Ultra Reduced Instruction Set (URISC) [1] core along side the simple core. This approach
is detailed in [2][14][15] and can both detect and recover from faults. It uses a URISC
instruction and a compiler that can be tuned to output programs with different levels of
protection. A program can be compiled to detects and corrects all errors for cases where
maximum reliability is required at the cost of additional instructions. A self test program
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can be combined with the detouring approach[5] to allow the core to work around a broken
instruction. Notably, a URISC core is Turing complete, so it can always work around a
broken instruction.
A URISC core adds little hardware overhead as the hardware to add the URISC in-
struction is small, even relative to a simple core. The main disadvantage of a URISC core
is the time overhead of checking instructions is large.
In this work we observe that the URISC checker instructions have significant instruction
level parallelism (as described in the next section), and we can execute URISC and other
instructions in parallel to provide significant speedups.
2.5 Circuit Level Hardening Techniques
Critical circuits can be hardened at the circuit level with specially designed logic and
storage cells. Dual Interlocked storage Cell (DICE) [16] hardened designs show reduced
error rates by two orders of magnitude by using redundant interlocked storage cells. Theses
cells use state restoring circuitry that corrects an errant value on one of the constituent
storage cells. This technique is a circuit level modular redundancy approach with the
redundancy applied at the logic cell level instead of at a system level. Further layout
optimization produced the Layout design through Error Aware Positioning (LEAP-DICE)
design[17] that maintains the error tolerance down to smaller feature sizes[18].
As these techniques are a form of modular redundancy they impose a significant area
and power overhead (approximately double), so should be used where the extra protection
is most required. Depending on the design all or only a portion of the circuits of a design
may be protected.
2.6 Out-of-Order Execution
The first core designs used in-order execution where instructions are fetched and executed
in program order. If an instruction or instruction or operand is not available, execution
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stops at that point in the pipeline until the missing item is available. In-order core designs
are still used today for many low power applications.
As core designs progressed and got bigger, techniques first described by Tomasulo[19]
introduced out-of-order execution to make better use of the available execution units. In
out-of-order execution, instructions are continually fetched, decoded and the referenced
operands are matched to the instruction. The instructions are added to a reorder buffer,
assigned to an execution unit, and the next instructions are fetched. The reorder buffer
allows the fetch unit to continue fetching instructions even if some operands for an instruc-
tion are not yet available. When the operands for an instruction become available, then
that instruction can complete. To keep track of intermediate register values, the regis-
ters are renamed. The reorder buffer keeps track of the instruction order and enables the
instructions to exit the core (or retire) in program order.
Speculation past branches is typically used to allow instructions after a branch to be
executed in anticipation of a certain branch direction. If the branch was predicted correctly,
the already executed instructions already have the work completed and can be retired. If
the branch was mis-predicted, the core simply throws out the speculative calculations and
fetches the actual instructions it needs to execute and starts work on those.
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Chapter 3
TigerMIPS-URISC Core
The concept of an Ultra Reduced Instruction Set core was first proposed in [1] as a teaching
tool for microprocessor design. It is unique because the simplest version of the core consists
of a single Turing complete instruction. The fact that it is Turing complete means the
core can execute any program that a more complex core can compute, albeit with more
instructions. These cores are also known as One Instruction Set Cores (OISC). We will
use the term URISC when referring to them.
A URISC core can be created with an instruction that both does a computation and
can affect the next instruction executed. The most common instruction of this type is the
subleq instruction as originally proposed in [1] and used extensively in [2][14][15].
3.1 Subleq
The subleq instruction is defined as follows:
subleq a, b, c;
First, a is subtracted from b, and the result stored in b. If the result is less than or
equal to zero, the machine jumps to the next instruction location specified by c. If the
result is greater than zero, the machine continues executing the next instruction without
jumping.
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3.2 URISC for Fault Detection and Recovery
Since a URISC core can perform the same tasks as any other program, we can use it to
check for errors and recover from them.
The TigerMIPS-URISC core as proposed in [14] pairs an in-order MIPS core with a
hardened URISC core as a co-processor. The hardened URISC core would be constructed
with more reliable (or duplicated) logic cells and would therefore be much more robust to
faults. As it only includes one instruction, the amount of logic to protect is small and the
area and power overhead is not large.
Each MIPS instruction has an equivalent sequence of subleq instructions that perform
the same operation. For example, the MIPS add instruction can be computed as follows:
MIPS Instruction
ADD rd, rs, rt
Equivalent URISC Instructions
mtu0 rs u1
mtu0 rt u2
subleqi u3 u3 0
subleqi u2 u3 0
subleqi u3 u1 0
mfu0 u1 rd
The MIPS instruction adds rs and rt and stores the result in rd. In this example, the
equivalent URISC instructions first move the rs and rt operands to URISC registers u1
and u2. u3 is then zeroed, u2 is negated into u3, then the negated u2 in u3 is subtracted
from u1 producing the sum of rs and rt. The result u1 is then copied back out to rd.
A program can be compiled such that it checks MIPS instructions by adding the equiv-
alent URISC instructions and URISC instructions to compare the MIPS instruction result.
If the check fails a recovery may be performed. Such a recovery would normally take the
form of using the more robust answer from the URISC core in place of the MIPS result.
If a particular core has an execution unit that is faulted, the program can be recompiled
using a Detouring[5] like approach to avoid that execution unit. Unlike the original detour-
ing paper, the TigerMIPS-URISC core has the capability to replace any faulty instruction
since any instruction can be replaced with a series of subleq instructions.
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Instruction checks can be applied to all instructions or only a subset, simply by pro-
viding the compiler the appropriate arguments. This enables solutions that check and
recover on each instruction (both permanent and transient fault protection) to solutions
only handling permanent faults. Additionally, only a portion of the instructions could be
checked, allowing approaches that statistically check for failing instructions.
3.3 Instruction Check Overhead
The main overhead of checking an instruction is in computing the result twice, followed by
a comparison. Unlike a DMR system that doubles the hardware to check the result, the
TigerMIPS-URISC core uses the simple URISC core that has a very small hardware area
in exchange for running a sequence of instructions to perform the check.
By looking at the add instruction above we note that the MIPS instruction takes 1
cycle, while the URISC equivalent takes 3 cycles plus an additional 3 cycles to move the
arguments between cores.
As both the URISC and MIPS core can access the same registers or cause a jump, the
TigerMIPS-URISC core in [14] executes a single instruction at a time - either a MIPS or
a URISC instruction. This means that adding a check for an instruction will add at least
100% overhead to any instruction check. In the case of the add instruction above, the
overhead is 600%.
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Chapter 4
Objective
The objective of this thesis is to present a method to accelerate the TigerMIPS-URISC
core. We do this by noting three main optimization areas:
• In the TigerMIPS-URISC core: when a MIPS instruction is executing the URISC
hardware is idle, and conversely when a URISC instruction is executing the MIPS
hardware is idle. The URISC and MIPS instructions are meant to compute the same
result, thus there are opportunities to run these instructions in parallel.
• In most programs, a statistical check will likely be used where only a portion of the
MIPS instructions are checked. In these cases, there will be many periods where no
corresponding URISC check instructions are generated for a given MIPS instruction.
When a MIPS instruction does need checking there will be a longer sequence of
URISC instructions that currently prevent MIPS instructions from running until the
entire URISC check sequence is complete. It would be advantageous to execute the
URISC check instructions for a MIPS instruction in parallel with the following MIPS
instructions, thereby hiding the time taken to check the instruction.
• A MIPS instruction replaced with URISC instructions should be able to be run
in parallel with other MIPS instructions. This offers the opportunity to speed up
existing MIPS programs.
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Therefore we would like a core that can execute the MIPS instruction in parallel with the
URISC check instructions. In addition, we would like the instruction check not to prevent
the MIPS core from making forward progress - basically, we’d like to defer committing the
results of the MIPS instruction until the check has completed.
4.1 Challenges
There are two basic challenges to running subleq instructions in parallel with MIPS instruc-
tions. First each and every subleq instruction can branch, and secondly, register values
need to be transferred from the MIPS register set to the URISC register set leading to
hazards when instructions are executed in parallel.
4.1.1 Challenge 1: Each Subleq is a Branch
Since each subleq instruction
subleq a, b, c;
jumps to instruction c if the result of a-b is less than or equal to zero, each and every
subleq instruction is a conditional branch. We also note that MIPS instructions may be
branches as well. To successfully run MIPS and URISC instructions in parallel we need
to handle jumps and branches efficiently. For example, we can not simply ensure that
branches are executed on their own because this would mean each subleq instruction (a
branch) could not be run in parallel with another instruction.
To handle this we introduce speculation into the solution core. We choose the simplest
form of speculation. A subleq rarely has the branch taken, so we speculate that the branch
is not taken for any conditional branch (including subleqs). Jumps are always taken, and
therefore are speculated as taken.
To implement speculation we introduce a Reorder Buffer (ROB) into the core. As
instructions are completed, they are marked complete in the ROB (along with whether the
branch was taken). As the instructions are retired from the ROB, the branch speculation
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is checked. If the speculation was incorrect, the processor pipeline is cleared and restarted
from the correct address.
4.1.2 Challenge 2: Hazards
Since URISC and MIPS instructions need to access the same argument and result registers
we recognize the need to protect against Read After Write (RAW) and Write After Write
(WAW) hazards when executing instructions in parallel.
To protect against these hazards we implement register remapping and a one entry
issue queue for each execution unit in the core.
For each architectural register we store it’s remapped location. The location for register
values are in the register file or in the ROB.
When an instruction is issued, the input arguments are taken from the register file (if
they aren’t remapped), or from the remapped ROB location. The ROB location could be
still pending.
An instruction will remain in the execution unit issue queue until all of it’s arguments
are available (we may be waiting on another instruction to write it’s result to the ROB).
When an instruction is retired from the ROB, the register value stored in the ROB is
written out to the architectural register file. In addition, the register remapping for the
destination register is checked to see if the current ROB entry is the last remapping of
the register location. If the last register remapping points to the current ROB entry, we
remove the remapping as we retire the ROB entry.
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Chapter 5
Solution Core
The core shown in Figure 5.1 shows the core design proposed to accelerate MIPS and
URISC instructions. The core is an out-of-order core with a single fetch unit, separate
decode circuitry for MIPS and URISC instructions, separate register files, and separate
execution units for MIPS and URISC instructions. The memory access unit is treated
as simply another execution unit. A reorder buffer (ROB) and common data bus (CDB)
complete the core.
5.1 Fetch
The core’s fetch unit is shown in Figure 5.2.
The core fetches from a 32 bit address space, fetching two instructions (64 bits) on each
fetch. By fetching two instructions on each cycle, approximately twice the throughput of
instructions can be processed when they are of different types. The fetched instructions
are captured and presented to the decode/issue unit along with whether the instruction
needs to be issued (not already issued) on the next cycle. Feedback is provided from the
decode/issue unit as to whether one or both instructions were issued in the current cycle.
The instruction address to fetch, iAddr, increments by 8 for on each cycle with the
following exceptions:
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Figure 5.1: Proposed Core
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Figure 5.2: Fetch
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Addr
1. A core reset resets the instruction fetch address to the reset vector.
2. The fetch has stalled (iStall). In this case the iAddr is retained until the iStall is
de-asserted.
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3. A jump has been taken. In this case the iAddr changes to the jump address and the
fetched instructions are cleared.
• If a jump is taken while the instruction fetch is stalled, we have a stalled jump
where the JumpAddr is captured and applied on the next unstalled cycle.
4. The decode unit has yet to consume the last fetched instructions. In this case the
previous fetch address is retained.
In the case of an odd address instruction jump, the even instruction is marked as already
issued so that it is not decoded and not issued by the decode/issue unit twice.
5.2 Decode/Issue Unit
The Decode/Issue unit is shown in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Decode/Issue
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It consists of decode circuitry for a single MIPS and a single URISC instruction and
the logic to issue these instructions to both the ROB and execution unit queues. A small
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common decode circuit determines if the (up to) two instructions presented from the fetch
unit are MIPS or URISC instructions. The Decode/Issue unit can issue a maximum of one
MIPS and one URISC instruction in parallel. When two MIPS or two URISC instructions
are fetched in the same 64 bit fetch, the two instructions are issued over two cycles. This
avoids the need to duplicate the MIPS or URISC decode circuitry, while still allowing two
instructions to be issued if they are not the same type.
The Decode/Issue unit also performs register remapping with reference to the register
file remap registers. Each architectural register is either replaced with the value of the
register or, if the value is not computed yet, the architectural register is replaced with
the ROB location that will contain the value when it becomes available. The issue unit
resolves register remapping when the second of the two fetched instructions relies on the
results of the first instruction in the fetched instruction pair.
The issue unit ensures that there are entries available in the ROB and that the execution
units are available before issuing an instruction. Instructions are issued in order, thus if
the first instruction’s execution unit is not ready, the issue unit will wait to issue both the
first and second instruction until the first instruction’s execution unit is ready.
5.2.1 Reorder Buffer
The Reorder Buffer used in this core is a 16 entry circular ROB. It is shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Reorder Buffer
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Most MIPS instructions have a single target register, however a few have two destination
registers, specifically:
• divide instructions store to both the HI and LO registers
• MULT and MULTU instructions store to both the HI and LO registers
In addition, the branch and link instructions have two output values - the jump desti-
nation address (if taken), and the link register.
Similarly, the subleq instruction also has two output values - the jump destination (if
taken), and the result register (rb).
Since a sufficient number of instructions need to return two values, two destination
register and value fields are included in each ROB entry. A side effect of this is that
moves to and from HI and LO registers now act similarly to a MIPS IV specification -
no longer requiring they be separated by a certain number of instructions to prevent UN-
PREDICTABLE behaviour. In the MIPS specifications I through III, UNPREDICTABLE
behaviour would result if these instructions were not separated by at least two instructions.
Each ROB entry consists of:
• Two destination register fields
• Two destination value fields
• A valid flag, set if the ROB entry is associated with a valid in flight instruction
• A complete flag, set to indicate the execution unit has written the value fields
• A speculated jump not taken flag, set to indicate the current instruction is a jump
and we have speculated that it was not taken
There are two ROB pointers - head and tail. Instructions are enqueued at the head
and retired at the tail.
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Retire
The ROB monitors the tail entries to determine if they can be retired. It has the capability
to retire up to two instructions per clock cycle: the tail entry and the tail -1 entry of the
ROB.
If the tail entry is not a taken jump/branch instruction, it is retired if it is valid and
complete. If it is a taken jump/branch instruction it is retired if both it and any delay slot
instruction (the tail -1 instruction) are both valid and complete. This restriction ensures
that branch delay slot instruction will be executed.
The same criteria are applied for the tail-1 ROB entry.
When a ROB entry is retired, the destination registers in the register file are updated
to the values in the ROB. If a jump was mis-predicted (taken), the ROB (less the branch
delay slot), execution unit queues, and fetched instructions are reset. The correct jump
address is then passed to the fetch unit and execution resumes at the correct address. The
jumpTaken signal is used to reset the execution units.
5.3 Execution Units
The execution units from both the MIPS and URISC cores are kept separate and not
duplicated, however a one entry queue is added at the input of each execution unit for the
Issue stage to issue into. It is shown in Figure 5.5.
Each execution unit indicates whether it is available to accept an instruction. This
signal is used by the decode/issue unit to determine if it can isue an instruction to the
execution unit. This logic take into account cases where the execution unit is not granted
the CDB when a result is ready.
The execution units in the core are as follows (as shown in 5.1):
• Memory Access
• ALU
25
Figure 5.5: Execution Units
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• Divide (DIV, DIVU)
• Multiply (MULT, MULTU, MUL)
• URISC (subleq, MFU, MTU)
• Branch
5.3.1 Memory Access Unit
The Memory Access unit takes a bit of additional care. Loads may execute at any time
and may be speculatively executed. Stores, on the other hand can not be started until
all speculative branches before the store are no longer speculative. The handle this, we
issue stores into the single entry Memory Access instruction queue, but monitor the ROB
entries from the ROB tail to the store instruction. Only once all these instructions are
either retired or not branches, will the store instruction continue through the Memory
Access execution unit.
Simply allowing memory access stalls to affect the Memory Access unit (and not the
rest of the core immediately) provides a significant speedup. This is primarily because
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instructions continue to enter the ROB and get speculatively executed, especially past
branches. Any loads past the branches would then get speculatively loaded and are then
ready as soon as they are needed.
5.4 Common Data Buses
The core has two Common Data Buses used for transferring the results of the execution
units to the ROB (and to the input queues of other execution units), thus two values can
be transferred on any one cycle.
We note that each ROB entry has provision for two values and an instruction that
writes to two registers will need to send two values to the ROB. This means that such an
instruction will need both CDBs or to split the two values over two cycles to transfer the
two values to the ROB. To simplify ROB handling we require the following of the CDB
arbitration:
• An Execution Unit that needs to write two values to the ROB shall be granted both
CDBs or none of them. This ensures that the results are written atomically.
One might be concerned that using only two CDBs on a core intended to execute two
instructions in parallel would present a bottleneck, as each instruction could theoretically
need to send two values to the ROB. In this worst case only a single instruction would
occupy all CDBs are we would only be able to process one instruction at a time. An
obvious solution to this concern is to use more CDBs, however CDBs are expensive since
they need to go to every execution unit.
The solution taken in this core is to observe the only instructions with two outputs are
divides, multiplies, jumps/branches(with link), and subleqs. All other instructions only
have out result register. The divides and multiplies can’t be optimized because they truly
need two outputs, however the jumps/branches/subleqs have already been speculated on,
and we only need to send information back when the speculation is incorrect. Thus we
can initialize the 2nd value (next instruction address) in the ROB when the instruction is
issued. The CDB will only have a value for this value if the speculated value is incorrect.
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Figure 5.6: Common Data Buses
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In the case of a subleq, normally the branch will not be taken (or will be taken to the
next instruction in sequence - not really a branch). In these cases, the next instruction
will be pre-populated in the ROB, and when the subleq instruction completes, the subleq
execution unit will only place the rb value on the CDB. If the branch is taken, both the rb
value and jump destination will be placed on the CDBs. (And since the CDB arbitration
ensures we will get both CDBs if needed, the ROB can mark the instruction as complete
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if it receives one or both values in a cycle.)
CDB requesters are given priority as follows:
• Memory access. The memory access unit is given first priority as memory accesses
typically end up being the bottleneck and to simplify the memory request pipeline
logic. This priority allocation allows the memory access unit to operate at full speed
without worrying about being stalled by the CDB.
• Execution units requesting both CDBs. To ensure a unit that needs to transfer two
values simultaneously can do so, it is given priority over units that only need one
CDB (memory accesses excepted).
• Execution units requesting a single CDB.
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Chapter 6
Compiler
The compiler used with the new core is a modified version of the TigerMIPS-URISC
compiler used in [2]. The basic URISC compiler adds two passes to the compiler chain:
• A MIPS substitution pass which replaces defective MIPS instructions with their
URISC equivalent instruction sequences based on a user supplied list of faulted in-
structions.
• A pre-assembler pass that runs before the MIPS assembler and assembles the URISC
instructions into encoded words. These assembled words then pass unmodified through
the MIPS assembler.
These passes effectively utilize the URISC hardware on the TigerMIPS-URISC core,
however an additional interleave pass is added for the proposed parallel core.
6.1 Interleave
To take full advantage of the parallel execution capabilities of the proposed core we require
the MIPS and URISC instructions to be interleaved so that a double fetch retrieves both a
30
URISC and a MIPS where possible. As described in Chapter 5, when both a URISC and
a MIPS instruction are fetched they can be decoded and issued simultaneously.
To achieve this interleave, a compiler pass is added after URISC instructions are substi-
tuted for defective MIPS instructions. This new pass looks for two USRIC instructions in
a row and then searches for a nearby MIPS instruction that can be moved between the two
URISC instructions. Register dependencies are checked to ensure the moved instruction
can be safely relocated without creating a data hazard (RAW, WAW, or WAR). Control
flow is also examined to prevent instructions being moved across control flow instructions.
Load and store instruction ordering is maintained.
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Chapter 7
Experimental Results
To measure the effectiveness of the new core a number of simulations were run with and
without faulted instructions.
7.1 Benchmarks
The benchmarks were derived from Mibench[20] benchmark suite, and are essentially the
same ones used in previous URISC work. There are 4 benchmarks used:
• Dijkstra: A benchmark implementing Dijkstra’s algorithm representing graph traver-
sal
• Bubble Sort: An implementation of the Bubble Sort algorithm
• RSA: A benchmark representing cryptographic performance
• String Search: A benchmark for evaluating string (byte) searching performance
The benchmarks were revised to operate entirely out of memory on a bare-metal envi-
ronment. The benchmark runs are repeatable and run for the same number of cycles each
time.
32
7.2 Methodology
To compare the two cores we recognize that the two cores use significantly different struc-
tures.
• The TigerMIPS-URISC core is a simple 5 stage in-order core with no speculation.
We will refer to this core as the vanilla core, as it contains no modifications from the
original work.
• The proposed out-of-order (ooo) core makes heavy use of speculation and is able to
execute instructions out of order.
To establish a baseline, we compile the benchmarks detailed in section 7.1 with the
same compiler (and flags) with no faulted instructions. We run these benchmarks on the
two cores to compare their performance.
With this as a baseline, we then recompile the benchmarks but this time tell the
compiler that various instructions are faulted and therefore need to be replaced with their
equivalent URISC instructions. The benchmarks with the faulted instructions replaced
with URISC instructions are then run again so the performance can be compared.
7.3 Results: Faulted Addu
The first results shows the performance of the cores with the Addu instruction faulted, and
therefore replaced with equivalent URISC instructions. The results are shown in Table 7.1
and Figure 7.1. Results are normalized to the performance of the TigerMIPS-URISC
(vanilla) core.
We observe that the new ooo core outperforms the vanilla core even in the un-faulted
case with speedups between 1.08 and 2.22 times the performance, with a geometric average
speedup of 1.49. As the ooo core is still not able to issue more than one MIPS instruction
per cycle we note that the majority of the speedup is due to the ability of the ooo core
to speculate past branches and execute multiple instructions per cycle. Depending on the
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benchmark, we also observe noticeable gains with the memory access unit and fetch units
no longer stalling the entire core on a memory stall. This allows more effective use of the
memory interfaces and increases performance.
Once the faulted instruction is introduced we note a significant performance penalty
in the vanilla core, with the dijkstra, rsa, and stringsearch benchmarks loosing approxi-
mately half their performance. The ooo core, however, is able to retain much more of its
performance despite the fault and is even able to beat the performance of an un-faulted
vanilla core most of the time. When compared with the faulted vanilla core speedups range
between 1.28 and 2.77 times, with a geometric average speedup of 1.93.
Figure 7.1: Benchmark Performance With Faults: addu
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Table 7.1: Performance Results, Faulted: addu
Benchmark
Speedup (higher is better) Speedup Faulted
(ooo vs vanilla)vanilla ooo vanilla-addu ooo-addu
bubblesort 1.00 1.16 0.86 1.10 1.28
dijkstra 1.00 1.78 0.53 1.12 2.09
rsa 1.00 2.22 0.60 1.66 2.77
stringsearch 1.00 1.08 0.43 0.82 1.89
7.4 Results: Faulted Subu
Results for faulted Subu instruction are shown in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2. The ooo core
has speedups of 1.16 to 4.22 times when compared with the faulted vanilla core, a geometric
average speedup of 1.82.
Figure 7.2: Benchmark Performance With Faults: subu
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Table 7.2: Performance Results, Faulted: subu
Benchmark
Speedup (higher is better) Speedup Faulted
(ooo vs vanilla)vanilla ooo vanilla-subu ooo-subu
bubblesort 1.00 1.16 1.00 1.16 1.16
dijkstra 1.00 1.78 1.00 1.78 1.78
rsa 1.00 2.22 0.29 1.23 4.22
stringsearch 1.00 1.08 0.85 1.07 1.26
7.5 Results: Faulted Addu and Subu
Results with both Addu and Subu instruction faulted are shown in Table 7.3 and Figure
7.3. The ooo core has speedups of 1.28 to 3.22 times when compared with the faulted
vanilla core, a geometric average speedup of 1.94.
Figure 7.3: Benchmark Performance With Faults: addu-subu
bubblesort dijkstra rsa stringsearch
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Table 7.3: Performance Results, Faulted: addu-subu
Benchmark
Speedup (higher is better) Speedup Faulted
(ooo vs vanilla)vanilla ooo vanilla-addu-
subu
ooo-addu-
subu
bubblesort 1.00 1.16 0.86 1.10 1.28
dijkstra 1.00 1.78 0.53 1.12 2.09
rsa 1.00 2.22 0.28 0.89 3.22
stringsearch 1.00 1.08 0.49 0.81 1.66
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This thesis analysed the TigerMIPS-URISC core to identify ways to accelerate computa-
tion. Opportunities to execute instructions in parallel were identified, primarily restricted
by data hazard handling and control constraints around the subleq branch.
8.1 Contributions
A core that solves the challenges identified is proposed. It accelerates programs with
URISC and MIPS instructions used for fault tolerant applications. Various benchmarks
were run on both the original core and the new core for comparison purposes. The results
show speedups of between 1.16 and 4.22 times, with a geometric average speedup of 1.90.
8.2 Future Work
This work compares the execution of the same subleq check code on both the urisc and
parallel urisc processor.
An area of future work is the investigation of runtime selection of instructions to check.
The current work relies on a compiler to select the set of instructions to check at compiler
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time. It also requires the compiler to insert the associated check code. These selected in-
structions are then always checked, while those instructions not selected are never checked.
It should be possible to provide the core with a region of memory containing the check
instruction code and add intelligence into the core so that it chooses which instructions to
check. This would relieve the compiler of the task of selecting which instructions to check
and allow any program compiled with a standard MIPS compiler to be checked without
binary modification. It would also allow the types of instructions to be checked by the core
to vary over time so as to achieve higher coverage rates.
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